The significance of structural rich club hubs for the processing of hierarchical stimuli.

The brain's structural network follows a hierarchy that is described as rich club (RC) organization, with RC hubs forming the well-interconnected top of this hierarchy. In this study, we tested whether RC hubs are involved in the processing of hierarchically higher structures in stimulus sequences. Moreover, we explored the role of previously suggested cortical gradients along anterior-posterior and medial-lateral axes throughout the frontal cortex. To this end, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment and presented participants with blocks of digit sequences that were structured on different hierarchically nested levels. We additionally collected diffusion weighted imaging data of the same subjects to identify RC hubs. This classification then served as the basis for a region of interest analysis of the fMRI data. Moreover, we determined structural network centrality measures in areas that were found as activation clusters in the whole-brain fMRI analysis. Our findings support the previously found anterior and medial shift for processing hierarchically higher structures of stimuli. Additionally, we found that the processing of hierarchically higher structures of the stimulus structure engages RC hubs more than for lower levels. Areas involved in the functional processing of hierarchically higher structures were also more likely to be part of the structural RC and were furthermore more central to the structural network. In summary, our results highlight the potential role of the structural RC organization in shaping the cortical processing hierarchy.

Ignore the glitch but mind the switch: Positive effects of methylphenidate on cognition in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder are related to prediction gain.

Neuropsychological symptoms such as inattention and distractibility constitute a core characteristic of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Here, we tested the hypothesis that attentional dysfunctions result from a deficit in neural gain modulation, which translates into difficulty in predictively weighting relevant sensory input while ignoring distraction. We compared thirty-seven hitherto untreated adults diagnosed with ADHD and thirty-eight healthy participants with a serial switch-drift task that requires internal models of predictable digit sequences to be either updated or stabilized. Switches between sequences that had to be indicated by key presses and digit omissions within a sequence (drifts) that should be ignored varied by stimulus-bound surprise quantified as Shannon information. To investigate whether catecholaminergic modulation by increasing extracellular norepinephrine and dopamine levels leads to an amelioration in prediction gain, participants were tested twice, with patients receiving a single dose of methylphenidate, a norepinephrine/dopamine reuptake inhibitor, in the second session. Patients and controls differed in both updating and stabilizing, depending on the respective event surprise. Specifically, patients showed difficulty in detecting expectable switches, while having greater difficulty to ignore surprising distractions. Thus, underconfident prior beliefs in ADHD may fail to appropriately weight expected relevant input, whereas the gain of neural responses to unexpected irrelevant distractors is increased. Methylphenidate improved both flexibility and stability of prediction and had a positive effect on selective responding over time. Our results suggest that ADHD is associated with an impairment in the use of prior expectations to optimally weight sensory inputs, which is improved by increasing catecholaminergic neurotransmission.

Interindividual differences in interoception modulate behavior and brain responses in emotional inference.

Emotional experiences are proposed to arise from contextualized perception of bodily responses, also referred to as interoceptive inferences. The recognition of emotions benefits from adequate access to one's own interoceptive information. However, direct empirical evidence of interoceptive inferences and their neural basis is still lacking. In the present fMRI study healthy volunteers performed a probabilistic emotion classification task with videotaped dynamically unfolding facial expressions. In a first step, we aimed to determine functional areas involved in the processing of dynamically unfolding emotional expressions. We then tested whether individuals with higher interoceptive accuracy (IAcc), as assessed by the Heartbeat detection task (HDT), or higher interoceptive sensitivity (IS), as assessed by the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness, Version 2 (MAIA-2), benefit more from the contextually given likelihood of emotional valence and whether brain regions reflecting individual IAcc and/or IS play a role in this. Individuals with higher IS benefitted more from the biased probability of emotional valence. Brain responses to more predictable emotions elicited a bilateral activity pattern comprising the inferior frontal gyrus and the posterior insula. Importantly, individual IAcc scores positively covaried with brain responses to more surprising and less predictable emotional expressions in the insula and caudate nucleus. We show for the first time that IAcc score is associated with enhanced processing of interoceptive prediction errors, particularly in the anterior insula. A higher IS score seems more likely to be associated with a stronger weighting of attention to interoceptive changes processed by the posterior insula and ventral prefrontal cortex.

What Happened When? Cerebral Processing of Modified Structure and Content in Episodic Cueing.

Episodic memories are not static but can change on the basis of new experiences, potentially allowing us to make valid predictions in the face of an ever-changing environment. Recent research has identified prediction errors during memory retrieval as a possible trigger for such changes. In this study, we used modified episodic cues to investigate whether different types of mnemonic prediction errors modulate brain activity and subsequent memory performance. Participants encoded episodes that consisted of short toy stories. During a subsequent fMRI session, participants were presented videos showing the original episodes, or slightly modified versions thereof. In modified videos, either the order of two subsequent action steps was changed or an object was exchanged for another. Content modifications recruited parietal, temporo-occipital, and parahippocampal areas reflecting the processing of the new object information. In contrast, structure modifications elicited activation in right dorsal premotor, posterior temporal, and parietal areas, reflecting the processing of new sequence information. In a post-fMRI memory test, the participants' tendency to accept modified episodes as originally encoded increased significantly when they had been presented modified versions already during the fMRI session. After experiencing modifications, especially those of the episodes' structure, the recognition of originally encoded episodes was impaired as well. Our study sheds light onto the neural processing of different types of episodic prediction errors and their influence on subsequent memory recall.

Corrigendum: Seeing What I Did (Not): Cerebral and Behavioral Effects of Agency and Perspective on Episodic Memory Re-activation.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2021.793115.].

Effects of DRD2/ANKK1 and COMT Val158Met polymorphisms on stabilization against and adaptation to unexpected events.

Genetic variations affecting dopaminergic neuromodulation such as the DRD2/ANKK1 and the COMT Val158Met polymorphisms contribute to goal-directed behavior that requires a balance between stabilization and updating of current states and behaviors. Dopamine is also thought to be relevant for encoding of surprise signals to sensory input and adaptive learning. A link between goal-directed behavior and learning from surprise is therefore plausible. In the present fMRI study, we investigated whether DRD2 and COMT polymorphisms are related to behavioral responses and neural signals in the caudate nucleus and dlPFC during updating or stabilizing internal models of predictable digit sequences. To-be-detected switches between sequences and to-be-ignored digit omissions within a sequence varied by information-theoretic quantities of surprise and entropy. We found that A1 noncarriers and Val-carriers showed a lower response threshold along with increased caudate and dlPFC activation to surprising switches compared with A1-carriers and Met-homozygotes, whose dlPFC activity increased with decreasing switch surprise. In contrast, there were overall smaller differences in behavioral and neural modulation by drift surprise. Our results suggest that the impact of dopamine-relevant polymorphisms in the flexibility-stability trade-off may result in part from the role of dopamine in encoding the weight afforded to events requiring updating or stabilization.

Cerebral and behavioral signs of impaired cognitive flexibility and stability in schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

BACKGROUND: Manifold cognitive deficits have been reported in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, including disturbances in flexible updating to altered circumstances as well as stabilization deficits in the face of distractors. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we examined the neural correlates of these deficits as two complementary components of predictive processing. METHODS: In 22 patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and 22 healthy matched control participants, we applied a serial predictive switch-drift task to assess flexibility as successful detection of prediction-rule switches, and stability as successfully ignoring distractors ("drifts"). RESULTS: Patients compared with controls less reliably detected rule switches and also less efficiently inhibited drifts. A reduced striatal response to switches or drifts correlated with weaker switch-drift-discrimination in patients, suggesting impaired gating of prediction errors. The increase in activity in anterior cingulate cortex and hippocampus for detected vs. undetected switches was reduced in patients compared to controls, which may reflect impaired behavioral adaptation following prediction errors. The comparison between shielding against distractions and undetected switches showed increased activity in the inferior frontal cortex and posterior insula in controls but not in patients. CONCLUSION: Our results suggest new insights into the specific disruption of predictive flexibility and stability in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, which is characterized by impaired striatal gating and inadequate cortical encoding of predictive errors.

Interoceptive sensibility predicts the ability to infer others' emotional states.

Emotional sensations and inferring another's emotional states have been suggested to depend on predictive models of the causes of bodily sensations, so-called interoceptive inferences. In this framework, higher sensibility for interoceptive changes (IS) reflects higher precision of interoceptive signals. The present study examined the link between IS and emotion recognition, testing whether individuals with higher IS recognize others' emotions more easily and are more sensitive to learn from biased probabilities of emotional expressions. We recorded skin conductance responses (SCRs) from forty-six healthy volunteers performing a speeded-response task, which required them to indicate whether a neutral facial expression dynamically turned into a happy or fearful expression. Moreover, varying probabilities of emotional expressions by their block-wise base rate aimed to generate a bias for the more frequently encountered emotion. As a result, we found that individuals with higher IS showed lower thresholds for emotion recognition, reflected in decreased reaction times for emotional expressions especially of high intensity. Moreover, individuals with increased IS benefited more from a biased probability of an emotion, reflected in decreased reaction times for expected emotions. Lastly, weak evidence supporting a differential modulation of SCR by IS as a function of varying probabilities was found. Our results indicate that higher interoceptive sensibility facilitates the recognition of emotional changes and is accompanied by a more precise adaptation to emotion probabilities.

Touching events predict human action segmentation in brain and behavior.

Recognizing the actions of others depends on segmentation into meaningful events. After decades of research in this area, it remains still unclear how humans do this and which brain areas support underlying processes. Here we show that a computer vision-based model of touching and untouching events can predict human behavior in segmenting object manipulation actions with high accuracy. Using this computational model and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), we pinpoint the neural networks underlying this segmentation behavior during an implicit action observation task. Segmentation was announced by a strong increase of visual activity at touching events followed by the engagement of frontal, hippocampal and insula regions, signaling updating expectation at subsequent untouching events. Brain activity and behavior show that touching-untouching motifs are critical features for identifying the key elements of actions including object manipulations.

Surmising synchrony of sound and sight: Factors explaining variance of audiovisual integration in hurdling, tap dancing and drumming.

Auditory and visual percepts are integrated even when they are not perfectly temporally aligned with each other, especially when the visual signal precedes the auditory signal. This window of temporal integration for asynchronous audiovisual stimuli is relatively well examined in the case of speech, while other natural action-induced sounds have been widely neglected. Here, we studied the detection of audiovisual asynchrony in three different whole-body actions with natural action-induced sounds-hurdling, tap dancing and drumming. In Study 1, we examined whether audiovisual asynchrony detection, assessed by a simultaneity judgment task, differs as a function of sound production intentionality. Based on previous findings, we expected that auditory and visual signals should be integrated over a wider temporal window for actions creating sounds intentionally (tap dancing), compared to actions creating sounds incidentally (hurdling). While percentages of perceived synchrony differed in the expected way, we identified two further factors, namely high event density and low rhythmicity, to induce higher synchrony ratings as well. Therefore, we systematically varied event density and rhythmicity in Study 2, this time using drumming stimuli to exert full control over these variables, and the same simultaneity judgment tasks. Results suggest that high event density leads to a bias to integrate rather than segregate auditory and visual signals, even at relatively large asynchronies. Rhythmicity had a similar, albeit weaker effect, when event density was low. Our findings demonstrate that shorter asynchronies and visual-first asynchronies lead to higher synchrony ratings of whole-body action, pointing to clear parallels with audiovisual integration in speech perception. Overconfidence in the naturally expected, that is, synchrony of sound and sight, was stronger for intentional (vs. incidental) sound production and for movements with high (vs. low) rhythmicity, presumably because both encourage predictive processes. In contrast, high event density appears to increase synchronicity judgments simply because it makes the detection of audiovisual asynchrony more difficult. More studies using real-life audiovisual stimuli with varying event densities and rhythmicities are needed to fully uncover the general mechanisms of audiovisual integration.

Positive and negative prediction error signals to violated expectations of face and place stimuli distinctively activate FFA and PPA.

Surprising scenarios can have different behavioural and neuronal consequences depending on the violation of the expectation. On the one hand, previous research has shown that the omission of a visual stimulus results in a robust cortical response representing that missing stimulus, a so-called negative prediction error. On the other hand, a large amount of studies revealed positive prediction error signals, entailing an increased neural response that can be attributed to the experience of a surprising, unexpected stimulus. However, there has been no evidence, so far, regarding how and when these prediction error signals co-occur. Here, we argue that the omission of an expected stimulus can and often does coincide with the appearance of an unexpected one. Therefore, we investigated whether positive and negative prediction error signals evoked by unpredicted cross-category stimulus transitions would temporally coincide during a speeded forced-choice fMRI paradigm. Foremost, our findings provide evidence of a behavioural effect regarding the facilitation of responses linked to expected stimuli. In addition, we obtained evidence for negative prediction error signals as seen in differential activation of FFA and PPA during unexpected place and face trials, respectively. Lastly, a psychophysiological interaction analysis revealed evidence for positive prediction error signals represented by context-dependent functional coupling between the right IFG and FFA or PPA, respectively, implicating a network that updates the internal representation after the appearance of an unexpected stimulus through involvement of this frontal area. The current results are consistent with a predictive coding account of cognition and underline the importance of considering the potential dual nature of expectation violations. Furthermore, our results put forward that positive and negative prediction error signalling can be directly linked to regions associated with the processing of different stimulus categories.

Seeing What I Did (Not): Cerebral and Behavioral Effects of Agency and Perspective on Episodic Memory Re-activation.

Intuitively, we assume that we remember episodes better when we actively participated in them and were not mere observers. Independently of this, we can recall episodes from either the first-person perspective (1pp) or the third-person perspective (3pp). In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we tested whether agency and perspective modulate neural activity during memory retrieval and subsequently enhance memory performance. Subjects encoded a set of different episodes by either imitating or only observing videos that showed short toy stories. A week later, we conducted fMRI and cued episodic retrieval by presenting the original videos, or slightly modified versions thereof, from 1pp or from 3pp. The hippocampal formation was sensitive to self-performed vs. only observed actions only when there was an episodic mismatch. In a post-fMRI memory test a history of self-performance did not improve behavioral memory performance. However, modified videos were often (falsely) accepted as showing truly experienced episodes when: (i) they were already presented in this modified version during fMRI or (ii) they were presented in their original form during fMRI but from 3pp. While the overall effect of modification was strong, the effects of perspective and agency were more subtle. Together, our findings demonstrate that self-performance and self-perspective modulate the strength of a memory trace in different ways. Even when memory performance remains the same for different agentive states, the brain is capable of detecting mismatching information. Re-experiencing the latter impairs memory performance as well as retrieving encoded episodes from 3pp.

Too Late! Influence of Temporal Delay on the Neural Processing of One's Own Incidental and Intentional Action-Induced Sounds.

The influence of delayed auditory feedback on action evaluation and execution of real-life action-induced sounds apart from language and music is still poorly understood. Here, we examined how a temporal delay impacted the behavioral evaluation and neural representation of hurdling and tap-dancing actions in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, postulating that effects of delay diverge between the two, as we create action-induced sounds intentionally in tap dancing, but incidentally in hurdling. Based on previous findings, we expected that conditions differ regarding the engagement of the supplementary motor area (SMA), posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG), and primary auditory cortex (A1). Participants were videotaped during a 9-week training of hurdling and tap dancing; in the fMRI scanner, they were presented with point-light videos of their own training videos, including the original or the slightly delayed sound, and had to evaluate how well they performed on each single trial. For the undelayed conditions, we replicated A1 attenuation and enhanced pSTG and SMA engagement for tap dancing (intentionally generated sounds) vs. hurdling (incidentally generated sounds). Delayed auditory feedback did not negatively influence behavioral rating scores in general. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response transiently increased and then adapted to repeated presentation of point-light videos with delayed sound in pSTG. This region also showed a significantly stronger correlation with the SMA under delayed feedback. Notably, SMA activation increased more for delayed feedback in the tap-dancing condition, covarying with higher rating scores. Findings suggest that action evaluation is more strongly based on top-down predictions from SMA when sounds of intentional action are distorted.

Incidental or Intentional? Different Brain Responses to One's Own Action Sounds in Hurdling vs. Tap Dancing.

Most human actions produce concomitant sounds. Action sounds can be either part of the action goal (GAS, goal-related action sounds), as for instance in tap dancing, or a mere by-product of the action (BAS, by-product action sounds), as for instance in hurdling. It is currently unclear whether these two types of action sounds-incidental or intentional-differ in their neural representation and whether the impact on the performance evaluation of an action diverges between the two. We here examined whether during the observation of tap dancing compared to hurdling, auditory information is a more important factor for positive action quality ratings. Moreover, we tested whether observation of tap dancing vs. hurdling led to stronger attenuation in primary auditory cortex, and a stronger mismatch signal when sounds do not match our expectations. We recorded individual point-light videos of newly trained participants performing tap dancing and hurdling. In the subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) session, participants were presented with the videos that displayed their own actions, including corresponding action sounds, and were asked to rate the quality of their performance. Videos were either in their original form or scrambled regarding the visual modality, the auditory modality, or both. As hypothesized, behavioral results showed significantly lower rating scores in the GAS condition compared to the BAS condition when the auditory modality was scrambled. Functional MRI contrasts between BAS and GAS actions revealed higher activation of primary auditory cortex in the BAS condition, speaking in favor of stronger attenuation in GAS, as well as stronger activation of posterior superior temporal gyri and the supplementary motor area in GAS. Results suggest that the processing of self-generated action sounds depends on whether we have the intention to produce a sound with our action or not, and action sounds may be more prone to be used as sensory feedback when they are part of the explicit action goal. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the function of action sounds for learning and controlling sound-producing actions.

Impaired context-sensitive adjustment of behaviour in Parkinson's disease patients tested on and off medication: An fMRI study.

The brain's sensitivity to and accentuation of unpredicted over predicted sensory signals plays a fundamental role in learning. According to recent theoretical models of the predictive coding framework, dopamine is responsible for balancing the interplay between bottom-up input and top-down predictions by controlling the precision of surprise signals that guide learning. Using functional MRI, we investigated whether patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) show impaired learning from prediction errors requiring either adaptation or stabilisation of current predictions. Moreover, we were interested in whether deficits in learning over a specific time scale would be accompanied by altered surprise responses in dopamine-related brain structures. To this end, twenty-one PD patients tested on and off dopaminergic medication and twenty-one healthy controls performed a digit prediction paradigm. During the task, violations of sequence-based predictions either signalled the need to update or to stabilise the current prediction and, thus, to react to them or ignore them, respectively. To investigate contextual adaptation to prediction errors, the probability (or its inverse, surprise) of the violations fluctuated across the experiment. When the probability of prediction errors over a specific time scale increased, healthy controls but not PD patients off medication became more flexible, i.e., error rates at violations requiring a motor response decreased in controls but increased in patients. On the neural level, this learning deficit in patients was accompanied by reduced signalling in the substantia nigra and the caudate nucleus. In contrast, differences between the groups regarding the probabilistic modulation of behaviour and neural responses were much less pronounced at prediction errors requiring only stabilisation but no adaptation. Interestingly, dopaminergic medication could neither improve learning from prediction errors nor restore the physiological, neurotypical pattern. Our findings point to a pivotal role of dysfunctions of the substantia nigra and caudate nucleus in deficits in learning from flexibility-demanding prediction errors in PD. Moreover, the data witness poor effects of dopaminergic medication on learning in PD.

Predictive Impact of Contextual Objects during Action Observation: Evidence from Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging.

The processing of congruent stimuli, such as an object or action in its typical location, is usually associated with reduced neural activity, probably due to facilitated recognition. However, in some situations, congruency increases neural activity-for example, when objects next to observed actions are likely versus unlikely to be involved in forthcoming action steps. Here, we investigated using fMRI whether the processing of contextual cues during action perception is driven by their (in)congruency and, thus, informative value to make sense of an observed scene. Specifically, we tested whether both highly congruent contextual objects (COs), which strongly indicate a future action step, and highly incongruent COs, which require updating predictions about possible forthcoming action steps, provide more anticipatory information about the action course than moderately congruent COs. In line with our hypothesis that especially the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) subserves the integration of the additional information into the predictive model of the action, we found highly congruent and incongruent COs to increase bilateral activity in action observation nodes, that is, the IFG, the occipitotemporal cortex, and the intraparietal sulcus. Intriguingly, BA 47 was significantly stronger engaged for incongruent COs reflecting the updating of prediction in response to conflicting information. Our findings imply that the IFG reflects the informative impact of COs on observed actions by using contextual information to supply and update the currently operating predictive model. In the case of an incongruent CO, this model has to be reconsidered and extended toward a new overarching action goal.

Association of grey matter changes with stability and flexibility of prediction in akinetic-rigid Parkinson's disease.

Parkinson's disease (PD), which is caused by degeneration of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain, results in a heterogeneous clinical picture including cognitive decline. Since the phasic signal of dopamine neurons is proposed to guide learning by signifying mismatches between subjects' expectations and external events, we here investigated whether akinetic-rigid PD patients without mild cognitive impairment exhibit difficulties in dealing with either relevant (requiring flexibility) or irrelevant (requiring stability) prediction errors. Following our previous study on flexibility and stability in prediction (Trempler et al. J Cogn Neurosci 29(2):298-309, 2017), we then assessed whether deficits would correspond with specific structural alterations in dopaminergic regions as well as in inferior frontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and the hippocampus. Twenty-one healthy controls and twenty-one akinetic-rigid PD patients on and off medication performed a task which required to serially predict upcoming items. Switches between predictable sequences had to be indicated via button press, whereas sequence omissions had to be ignored. Independent of the disease, midbrain volume was related to a general response bias to unexpected events, whereas right putamen volume correlated with the ability to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant prediction errors. However, patients compared with healthy participants showed deficits in stabilisation against irrelevant prediction errors, associated with thickness of right inferior frontal gyrus and left medial prefrontal cortex. Flexible updating due to relevant prediction errors was also affected in patients compared with controls and associated with right hippocampus volume. Dopaminergic medication influenced behavioural performance across, but not within the patients. Our exploratory study warrants further research on deficient prediction error processing and its structural correlates as a core of cognitive symptoms occurring already in early stages of the disease.

Making sense of objects lying around: How contextual objects shape brain activity during action observation.

Action recognition involves not only the readout of body movements and involved objects but also the integration of contextual information, e.g. the environment in which an action takes place. Notably, inferring superordinate goals and generating predictions about forthcoming action steps should benefit from screening the actor's immediate environment, in particular objects located in the actor's peripersonal space and thus potentially used in following action steps. Critically, if such contextual objects (COs) afford actions that are semantically related to the observed action, they may trigger or facilitate the inference of goals and the prediction of following actions. This fMRI study investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the integration of COs in semantic and spatial relation to observed actions. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) subserves this integration. Participants observed action videos in which COs and observed actions had common overarching goals or not (goal affinity) and varied in their location relative to the actor. High goal affinity increased bilateral activity in action observation network nodes, i.e. the occipitotemporal cortex and the intraparietal sulcus, but also in the precuneus and middle frontal gyri. This finding suggests that the semantic relation between COs and actions is considered during action observation and triggers (rather than facilitates) processes beyond those usually involved in action observation. Moreover, COs with high goal affinity located close to the actor's dominant hand additionally engaged bilateral IFG, corroborating the view that IFG is critically involved in the integration of action steps under a common overarching goal.

Frontostriatal Contribution to the Interplay of Flexibility and Stability in Serial Prediction.

Surprising events may be relevant or irrelevant for behavior, requiring either flexible adjustment or stabilization of our model of the world and according response strategies. Cognitive flexibility and stability in response to environmental demands have been described as separable cognitive states, associated with activity of striatal and lateral prefrontal regions, respectively. It so far remains unclear, however, whether these two states act in an antagonistic fashion and which neural mechanisms mediate the selection of respective responses, on the one hand, and a transition between these states, on the other. In this study, we tested whether the functional dichotomy between striatal and prefrontal activity applies for the separate functions of updating (in response to changes in the environment, i.e., switches) and shielding (in response to chance occurrences of events violating expectations, i.e., drifts) of current predictions. We measured brain activity using fMRI while 20 healthy participants performed a task that required to serially predict upcoming items. Switches between predictable sequences had to be indicated via button press while sequence omissions (drifts) had to be ignored. We further varied the probability of switches and drifts to assess the neural network supporting the transition between flexible and stable cognitive states as a function of recent performance history in response to environmental demands. Flexible switching between models was associated with activation in medial pFC (BA 9 and BA 10), whereas stable maintenance of the internal model corresponded to activation in the lateral pFC (BA 6 and inferior frontal gyrus). Our findings extend previous studies on the interplay of flexibility and stability, suggesting that different prefrontal regions are activated by different types of prediction errors, dependent on their behavioral requirements. Furthermore, we found that striatal activation in response to switches and drifts was modulated by participants' successful behavior toward these events, suggesting the striatum to be responsible for response selections following unpredicted stimuli. Finally, we observed that the dopaminergic midbrain modulates the transition between different cognitive states, thresholded by participants' individual performance history in response to temporal environmental demands.

Decomposing Self-Control: Individual Differences in Goal Pursuit Despite Interfering Aversion, Temptation, and Distraction.

Self-control can be defined as the ability to exert control over ones impulses. Currently, most research in the area relies on self-report. Focusing on attentional control processes involved in self-control, we modified a spatial selective attentional cueing task to test three domains of self-control experimentally in one task using aversive, tempting, and neutral picture-distractors. The aims of the study were (1) to investigate individual differences in the susceptibility to aversive, tempting, and neutral distraction within one paradigm and (2) to test the association of these three self-control domains to conventional measures of self-control including self-report. The final sample consisted of 116 participants. The task required participants to identify target letters "E" or "F" presented at a cued target location while the distractors were presented. Behavioral and eyetracking data were obtained during the performance of the task. High task performance was encouraged via monetary incentives. In addition to the attentional self-control task, self-reported self-control was assessed and participants performed a color Stroop task, an unsolvable anagram task and a delay of gratification task using chocolate sweets. We found that aversion, temptation, and neutral distraction were associated with significantly increased error rates, reaction times and gaze pattern deviations. Overall task performance on our task correlated with self-reported self-control ability. Measures of aversion, temptation, and distraction showed moderate split-half reliability, but did not correlate with each other across participants. Additionally, participants who made a self-controlled decision in the delay of gratification task were less distracted by temptations in our task than participants who made an impulsive choice. Our individual differences analyses suggest that (1) the ability to endure aversion, resist temptations and ignore neutral distractions are independent of each other and (2) these three domains are related to other measures of self-control.